We study the timing of new technology adoption in markets with input outsourcing, and thus with vertical relations. We …nd that technology adoption can take place earlier when …rms engage in input outsourcing than when they produce the input in-house. Hence, the presence of vertical relations can accelerate the adoption of a new technology. We also …nd that particular features of a vertically related market, such as the bargaining power distribution and the contract type through which trading is conducted, can crucially a¤ect the speed of technology adoption.
Introduction
In today's economy, many …rms outsource their inputs to external input producers instead of producing them in-house. This is common in many industries, including the automotive, aircraft, computer, mobile phone, and pharmaceutical sectors. 1 As demonstrated in a number of empirical studies, a …rm's organizational mode of production-the use of in-house production or outsourcing-can crucially in ‡uence, among other things, the rate at which it adopts new technologies. In particular, Dewan et al. (1998) , Hitt (1999) , and Forman and Gron (2011) show that the degree of vertical integration of US …rms is negatively correlated to their adoption of information technology (IT). In the same vein, Girma and Lancheros (2009) show that there are complementarities between input imports, outsourcing, and the rate of technology adoption in the software services and pharmaceutical industries of India. Others, however, provide evidence to the contrary. Lane (1991) , Carlsson and Jacobsson (1994) , and Helper (1995) show that in-house production encourages the adoption of new technologies in the US coal industry, the Swedish engineering industry, and the US automotive industry, respectively.
The mechanisms via which the organizational mode of production a¤ects a …rm's timing of technology adoption are still unexplored. In this paper, we study these mechanisms. Our aim is to provide answers to the following questions. How does the timing of technology adoption di¤er among di¤erent organizational structures of production, and in particular between input outsourcing and in-house input production? What is the impact of the main features of vertical trading-the contract type used and the bargaining power distribution-on the speed of adoption? 2 How does the e¤ectiveness of new technology in ‡uence the speed of its adoption and, more importantly, its di¤usion among competing …rms?
To address these questions, we use a framework in which under outsourcing two competing downstream …rms produce a …nal product using an input that they obtain from two external upstream …rms. Trading between the upstream and downstream …rms is exclusive and is conducted via two-part tari¤ contracts or linear wholesale price contracts. The downstream …rms are initially endowed with the same production technology. However, they can both 1 adopt a new cost-reducing technology. If a downstream …rm adopts the new technology …rst, it enjoys a competitive advantage over its rival. However, if it adopts the new technology second, it incurs a lower adoption cost. 3 A game with an in…nite horizon is analyzed in which the downstream …rms choose their technology adoption dates at the start and commit to them. In every period thereafter, they …rst negotiate with their respective upstream suppliers over their contract terms, and then choose their output. The same game but without negotiations over the contract terms is also played in the case of insourcing, that is, when the two downstream …rms produce their input in-house.
Our analysis reveals that there are two e¤ects under outsourcing that are absent under insourcing. In a vertically related market, a downstream …rm does not obtain the whole surplus that it generates. In fact, with two-part tari¤s it obtains only the share that corresponds to its bargaining power. As a consequence, when the upstream bargaining power increases, a downstream …rm's incentives to undertake costly technology adoption get weaker. This is the …rst e¤ect, the pro…ts sharing e¤ ect. The second e¤ect, the terms of trade e¤ ect, refers to the better trading terms-the lower wholesale price-that an upstream …rm o¤ers to its downstream customer when they trade via two-part tari¤s and the latter adopts the new technology. This occurs because an upstream …rm has incentives to increase the competitiveness of its downstream customer by charging a lower wholesale price since it can extract part of the resulting higher downstream pro…ts through the …xed fee. When its downstream customer adopts the new technology, its e¢ ciency and pro…ts increase; hence, the upstream …rm's incentives to o¤er better contract terms are reinforced.
In light of the above, we show that vertical relations not only a¤ect the speed of technology adoption but also, more importantly, can accelerate it. Stated di¤erently, a …rm that engages in input outsourcing can adopt the new technology earlier than a …rm that produces the input in-house. Clearly, this result is driven by the presence of the terms of trade e¤ ect under outsourcing that reinforces the technology adoption incentives. However, the terms of trade e¤ ect does not always lead to earlier adoption under outsourcing than under insourcing.
When the upstream bargaining power is su¢ ciently high, the pro…ts sharing e¤ ect is strong and dominates, resulting in earlier adoption under insourcing. Importantly, by extending our analysis we demonstrate that the positive impact of outsourcing on the timing of technology adoption is reinforced when …rms are unable to commit to their adoption dates at the outset and can instead respond immediately and costlessly to their rival's adoption plan.
Furthermore, we show that the contract type used in vertical trading can play a crucial role in the timing of technology adoption: adoption can occur earlier under two-part tari¤ contracts than under linear wholesale price contracts when the downstream …rms are su¢ ciently powerful. The intuition behind this lies mainly on the reversal of the terms of trade e¤ ect under wholesale price contracts. The reversal is due to the fact that under such contracts, the only tool an upstream …rm has to obtain part of the higher pro…ts resulting from technology adoption is the wholesale price. This is also why a downstream …rm obtains a relatively greater share of the surplus under wholesale price contracts than under two-part tari¤s. Thus, when downstream …rms are less powerful, the pro…ts sharing e¤ ect, which favors wholesale price contracts, leads to earlier technology adoption under such contracts. When wholesale price contracts are used, owing to double marginalization and the reversal of the terms of trade e¤ ect and in contrast to what happens with two-part tari¤s, vertical relations always slow down the speed of technology adoption.
Finally, we show that as expected, when the new technology is more e¤ective it is adopted faster, but the time span between successive adoptions is longer. 4 This is because the terms of trade e¤ ect is stronger for the …rst than for the second adopter of the technology.
Our …ndings are consistent with the aforementioned empirical studies (e.g., Lane, 1991 , Dewan et al.,1998 Forman and Gron, 2011; Helper, 1995) demonstrating that the organizational structure of production can a¤ect the technology adoption rate. Moreover, our results suggest that the diversity in the conclusions of these studies regarding the impact of outsourcing on the timing of technology adoption could be attributed to di¤erences in market features, such as the bargaining power of input suppliers and/or the contract types used in vertical trading.
Our …ndings suggest, for instance, that while a new technology could be adopted earlier under outsourcing in a market with relatively weak input producers, it could be adopted earlier under insourcing in a market with powerful input producers.
There is ample evidence that there are often long time lags between the invention of new technologies and their adoption, and signi…cant di¤erences in the adoption timing among di¤er-ent …rms and di¤erent markets (Griliches, 1957; Mans…eld, 1968 Mans…eld, , 1985 Rogers, 1995; Jovanovic and Lach, 1997; Genesove, 1999; Astebro, 2002) . 5 In addition, the speed of the adoption of new technologies constitutes a fundamental determinant of economic growth. Given this, an extensive literature on the timing of technology adoption in the presence of strategic interactions has been developed (e.g., Reinganum, 1981a&b, 1983a&b (Cabral, 1990; Choi and Thum, 1998) , information externalities (Chamley and Gale, 1994) , strategic managerial delegation (Mahathi and Rupayan, 2013) , and the mode and intensity of market competition (Milliou and Petrakis, 2011) . However, the aforementioned literature has dealt exclusively with one-tier markets, that is, markets with in-house input production. Instead, we consider vertically related markets. Doing so, we o¤er an alternative explanation for variations in adoption timing across di¤erent markets based on the features of vertically related markets and the vertical relations themselves.
Our work is also related to the literature that has considered R&D investments in vertically the strategic incentives and implications of make-or-buy decisions-the choice between inhouse production and outsourcing-and alternative input sourcing strategies (e.g., Beladi and Mukherjee, 2012; Stenbacka and Tombak, 2012) . In line with this literature, we consider dif-5 A typical example of delays in the adoption and di¤usion of new technologies is the basic oxygen furnace (BOF), a technological breakthrough in the steel industry that reduces the processing time and cost of steel making. There was a 15-year time lag between BOF invention and its adoption, and it took more than 20 years for di¤usion of its use from 10% to 90% (Hoppe, 2002) . A more recent example comes from the manufacture of mobile chips, for which there are time lags in the adoption of next-generation (nanometer) manufacturing technologies among competing …rms such as TSMC, Intel, and Samsung. However, this is not the case for all new technologies, and some (e.g., mobile phones) have rapidly di¤used in the market.
6 Hoppe (2002) provides an extensive survey of the theoretical literature on the timing of technology adoption.
4 ferent organizational structures of production, with a particular focus on the impact of these structures on the timing of technology adoption.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our model. In Section 3, we determine the optimal adoption dates in a vertically related market. Section 4 examines the impact of vertical relations on the timing of technology adoption.
In Section 5, we analyze the role of the contract type. Section 6 discusses possible extensions of our model.
Finally, Section 7 concludes. All proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
The Model
We consider a vertically related industry consisting of two upstream and two downstream …rms denoted by U i and D i , respectively, with i = 1; 2. The upstream …rms produce an input at zero marginal cost. The downstream …rms transform the input into a …nal good on a one-to-one basis and face initially an exogenous marginal cost, c, plus the cost of the input. The latter cost corresponds to the terms of a two-part tari¤ contract, that is, to a per unit of input wholesale price, w i , and a …xed fee, f i . 7 Trade relations between U i and D i are exclusive (see Figure 1) . 8 Demand for the …nal good is given by p(Q) = a Q, where Q = q i + q j is the total quantity, with i; j = 1; 2 and i 6 = j. 9
7 In Section 5, we examine the case in which …rms trade via wholesale price contracts that include only wi. 8 Exclusive relations can exist because upstream …rms produce inputs that are tailored for speci…c downstream …rms and there are irreversible investments that create high switching costs. Exclusivity is a common assumption in the literature on vertical relations (e.g., Horn and Wolinsky, 1988 9 Although the …nal products are homogeneous, they can still be produced via di¤erent production technologies that in turn require di¤erent or specialized inputs. This is the case for a number of products that tend to be homogeneous, such as textiles, plastics, and paper, but are produced by some …rms using traditional technologies and by others using biotechnology (Gil-Moltó et al., 2005 ). As we demonstrate in Section 6.2, our main results also hold when …nal products are di¤erentiated as long as the degree of di¤erentiation is not too high. or not it has adopted the technology. Adoption of the new technology is costly. Following Reinganum (1981a&b) and Fudenberg and Tirole (1985) and letting k(t) denote the present value of the cost of bringing the new technology on line by date t, we assume that (k(t)e rt ) 0 < 0 and (k(t)e rt ) 00 > 0, where r (0 < r < 1) is the interest rate. That is, the current cost of adoption, k(t)e rt , is decreasing, but at a decreasing rate. The latter implies that the current cost of adoption falls faster than the discount rate e r . These assumptions are satis…ed, for instance, by k(t) = e (r+ )t , with > 0. We also assume that technology adoption cannot occur immediately because of prohibitively high costs, but that it always occurs at a …nite date: lim t!0 k(t) = lim t!0 k 0 (t) = 1 and lim t!1 k 0 (t)e rt = 0. Finally, as standard in the technology adoption literature, we assume that no other technological improvements are available or will become available in the market.
Firms play the following game with observable actions. At t = 0, each D i decides its adoption date T i , the date on which it will adopt the new technology. Moreover, at t = 0 and in every other period t > 0, …rst, each (U i ; D i ) pair bargains over the contract terms (w i ; f i ), and then D i and D j simultaneously set their quantities after observing all the contract terms. 10 We model the bargaining over contract terms in the …rst stage of every period t by invoking 1 0 According to the terminology of Rey and Vergé (2004) , we assume that contract terms are interim observable. That is, a downstream …rm observes not only its own contract terms but also the contract terms of its rival before the …nal market competition takes place. A similar assumption has been used by Horn and Wolinsky (1988) , Gal-Or (1991), and McAfee and Schwartz (1995), among others. 6 the Nash equilibrium of simultaneous generalized Nash bargaining problems. We assume that the bargaining power of each U i and D i is and 1 , respectively, with 0 < < 1.
The game we have described is based on the precommitment game of Reinganum (1981a&b) .
The precommitment game captures the idea that a …rm that would like to incorporate a technological improvement and bring it on line constructs and follows well-designed long-term plans.
Note that the precommitment strategies are time-consistent only if the cost of altering adoption plans is su¢ ciently high. Therefore, a …rm cannot adjust its adoption timing in response to its rival's past actions. The precommitment game also captures the case of a market with in…nite information lags, or else, with an open-loop information structure. 11
To guarantee that all …rms are active and that their marginal costs are positive in all the cases considered, we assume the following throughout.
The parameter measures the e¤ectiveness of the new technology. In particular, it measures how e¤ective the new technology is in reducing the marginal production cost of the downstream …rms relative to the market size. The higher that is, the more e¤ective is the new technology.
We …nally assume, without loss of generality, that if the downstream …rms do not adopt the technology simultaneously, then D 1 is the …rst adopter and D 2 is the second adopter.
Moreover, for periods in which only D 1 has adopted the technology, we refer to D 1 as the technology leader and to D 2 as the technology laggard.
Optimal Adoption Timing
In the second stage of every period t > 0, each D i chooses its output q i to maximize its perperiod gross (from the adoption cost and f i ) pro…ts, given by
resulting equilibrium quantities and (gross) downstream and upstream pro…ts are
1 1 In Section 6.1, we extend our analysis to a closed-loop framework and show that our results remain qualitatively intact. In particular, following Fudenberg and Tirole (1985) , we consider a preemption game in which downstream …rms are able to adjust their adoption dates with respect to what has happened in the past. This occurs when there are no information lags and the cost of altering adoption plans is in…nitesimal, and thus …rms can immediately respond to the adoption plans of their rivals.
In the …rst stage of every period t > 0, each (U i ; D i ) pair, taking as given the outcome of the simultaneous negotiations of the (U j ; D j ) pair, (w T j , f T j ), solves the following maximization problem
Maximizing (3) with respect to f i , we obtain
. Substituting f i into (3), we note that the generalized Nash product is proportional to the perperiod joint pro…ts of (U i ; D i ) and that U i and D i obtain a share of these pro…ts corresponding to their respective bargaining power, and 1 . It follows that w i is chosen to maximize their per-period joint pro…ts:
The resulting equilibrium wholesale prices are
A number of observations can be made regarding the equilibrium wholesale prices. First, the wholesale prices are independent of the bargaining power distribution. Second, they are always lower than the upstream marginal cost, that is, the upstream …rms subsidize their downstream customers. 12 This occurs because a decrease in w i shifts the reaction function of D i outwards.
Given that the reaction functions are downward-sloping, this shift leads to a lower output for rival D j and a higher output and gross pro…ts for D i . In turn, U i receives part of the resulting higher gross pro…ts obtained by its downstream customer by charging a higher …xed fee.
The above observations have already been noted in the literature on vertically related markets (e.g., Milliou and Petrakis, 2007) . A novel observation we make here is that the wholesale price charged to D i decreases, and thus the subsidization increases, when D i adopts the new technology. This clearly implies that when D i adopts the technology, the cost reduction that it enjoys is greater than . In particular, the e¤ ective cost reduction caused by technology adoption is + w T i (c; c) w T 1 (c ; c) > for the technology leader, and + w T 2 (c ; c) This is because, as mentioned above, it can then charge a higher …xed fee and transfer part of the resulting higher gross downstream pro…ts upstream.
We should note that the terms of trade e¤ ect is stronger in periods in which D 1 is the technology leader than in periods in which both …rms have adopted the technology:
Moreover, the terms of trade e¤ ect does not favor the technology laggard. In particular, D 2 is charged a higher wholesale price when its rival adopts We should also note that the terms of trade e¤ ect is stronger when the new technology is more e¤ective, that is, the wholesale price(s) charged to the technology adopter(s) decreases with and thus with . It is clear that this occurs because the higher that is, the greater is the cost reduction that an adopter enjoys, and thus the greater is its output. Moreover, since the cost advantage of the technology leader D 1 becomes more pronounced when increases, it follows that the output of the technology laggard D 2 shrinks, and thus w 2 increases with .
Substituting (4) into (1) and (2), we obtain the equilibrium per-period quantities and downstream pro…ts
We now address the choice of adoption date T i by D i at t = 0. It is clear that D i will choose T i to maximize the discounted sum of its in…nite stream of per-period pro…ts. In particular, the maximization problems that D 1 and D 2 face are
and (6) and (7) result in …rms always have incentives to adopt the technology (I T i > 0) and that …rst adoption leads to higher incremental bene…ts than second adoption (I T 1 > I T 2 ). This, along with our assumptions regarding the cost of adoption, implies that T T 1 < T T 2 , and thus that in equilibrium there is technology di¤usion.
The following proposition describes how the bargaining power distribution and the e¤ec-tiveness of the new technology in ‡uence the adoption pattern. 
The higher the upstream bargaining power, the later the downstream …rms adopt the new technology. The intuition for this is straightforward. We know from above that D i obtains the share of its joint pro…ts with U i that corresponds to its bargaining power. As a consequence, the higher the upstream bargaining power, the smaller is D i 's share of the joint pro…ts, and thus the weaker are its incentives to undertake costly technology adoption. From now on we refer to the negative impact of the upstream bargaining power on technology adoption incentives as the pro…ts sharing e¤ ect.
The pro…ts sharing e¤ ect is stronger for the …rst adopter than for the second adopter, that is, the incentives for the …rst adopter increase more than those for the second adopter when decreases. This is because the increase in the joint pro…ts of D 1 and U 1 induced by …rst adoption is greater than that in the joint pro…ts of D 2 and U 2 induced by second adoption.
More speci…cally, …rst adoption results in a high cost advantage for D 1 relative to D 2 not only because D 1 then utilizes a more e¢ cient technology but also because it enjoys a positive terms of trade e¤ ect. By contrast, second adoption does not generate any cost advantage for D 2 , it simply eliminates the cost advantage of D 1 . A consequence of this is that, as stated in Proposition 1, the di¤erence in adoption dates between the …rst and second adopter increases when the upstream bargaining power decreases.
As expected, both …rst and second adoption occur earlier when the new technology is more e¤ective. In our setting, this holds not only because the new technology delivers greater cost reductions but also because the terms of trade e¤ ect is stronger, as mentioned previously, and thus the e¤ective cost reduction is greater. Proposition 1 also indicates that the more e¤ective the new technology, the longer is the time span between …rst and second adoption. This is because an increase in , similarly to a decrease in , leads to a greater increase in pro…ts for …rst adoption than for second adoption.
Impact of Vertical Relations: Outsourcing vs. Insourcing
In this section we examine how vertical relations a¤ect the speed of technology adoption by comparing optimal adoption dates between a one-tier market and a vertically related market, which corresponds to a comparison between in-house input production and input outsourcing.
To perform the comparison, we …rst need to examine, similar to the literature on technology adoption (e.g., Reinganum, 1981a&b; Quirmbach, 1986; Milliou and Petrakis, 2011) , what happens in a one-tier industry. That is, we need to determine the optimal adoption dates of two …rms that initially face marginal cost c and play the same game as the one described in Section 2, with the only di¤erence that w i = f i = 0. 13 Obtaining the optimal adoption dates for a one-tier market and comparing them with those for a vertically related market, we …nd the following. 14 Proposition 2 (i) First adoption occurs earlier in a vertically related market than in a onetier market if and only if the upstream bargaining power is su¢ ciently low, that is, < 1 ( ), where @ 1 ( )=@ > 0.
(ii) Second adoption occurs earlier in a vertically related market than in a one-tier market if and only if the new technology is not too e¤ ective and the upstream bargaining power is su¢ ciently low, that is, < 4 27 and < 2 ( ), where @ 2 ( )=@ < 0.
Interestingly, technology can be adopted earlier with outsourcing than with insourcing. In The intuition for this …nding is as follows. It is well known from the literature that when a …rm's output increases, its incentives to become more e¢ cient, and thus its incentives to invest in a cost-reducing technology, become stronger. This is the so-called output e¤ ect. 15 In our setting, the output e¤ ect is present for with both outsourcing and insourcing, although it is stronger with the former. There are two reasons for this. The …rst is that D i faces a lower e¤ective cost under outsourcing than under insourcing owing to the subsidization of downstream production, and thus it produces more under outsourcing. The second is the positive terms of trade e¤ ect, which is present only under outsourcing. In particular, when D i invests in technology adoption, its e¤ective cost reduces by more and thus its output increases by more under outsourcing than under insourcing owing to the improvement in trade terms.
In light of the above, we would expect that a …rm should always adopt technology earlier under outsourcing than under insourcing. However, Proposition 2 indicates that this does not always hold. This is because there is an additional e¤ect under outsourcing that is absent under insourcing that weakens the adoption incentives: the pro…ts sharing e¤ ect (Proposition 1). When the upstream bargaining power is low, the pro…ts sharing e¤ ect is weak and is dominated by the terms of trade e¤ ect; hence, the …rst adopter adopts the technology earlier under outsourcing than under insourcing. This also holds for the second adoption, but only if the new technology is not too e¤ective. This is because under outsourcing, the unfavorable impact of the terms of trade e¤ ect on the technology laggard becomes more severe as the technology becomes more e¤ective.
5 Role of the Contract Type: Wholesale Price Contracts vs.
Two-part Tari¤s
In this section we investigate whether and how the contract type used in a vertically related market a¤ects the timing of adoption. To do so, we examine what happens when vertical trading occurs via linear wholesale price contracts.
In the …rst stage of every period t 0, each (U i ; D i ) pair maximizes (3) in terms of w i after setting f i = 0 and substituting w T j with w W j , where w W j is the equilibrium wholesale price of the pair (U j ; D j ). The resulting equilibrium wholesale prices are
Under wholesale price contracts, the equilibrium wholesale prices behave in exactly the opposite way than under two-part tari¤ contracts. In particular, under wholesale price contracts the equilibrium wholesale prices depend on the bargaining power distribution, as is already known from the literature (Milliou and Petrakis, 2007) . Moreover, equilibrium wholesale prices increase with the upstream bargaining power and exceed the upstream marginal cost, that is, double marginalization is present. The novel …nding here is that under wholesale price contracts, the equilibrium wholesale price charged to D i increases when the latter adopts the technology; thus, the adopter's e¤ ective cost reduction is lower than . This clearly implies that in the case of wholesale price contracts, the terms of trade e¤ ect is negative instead of positive. The reversal of the terms of trade e¤ ect is driven by the fact that under wholesale price contracts, the only tool that an upstream …rm has for achieving positive pro…ts is the wholesale price. When D i adopts the new technology, it becomes more e¢ cient and thus its upstream supplier increases the wholesale price charged. Moreover, we …nd that the terms of trade e¤ ect is more negative for an adopter in periods in which it is the technology leader than in periods in which both …rms have adopted the technology.
The fact that the terms of trade e¤ ect is negative under wholesale price contracts favors the technology laggard; D 2 pays a lower wholesale price when its rival adopts the technology.
This occurs because U 2 wants to guarantee that D 2 remains in the market; otherwise, U 2 will make zero sales and pro…ts. Moreover, the more e¤ective the new technology is, and thus the more e¢ cient the adopter becomes, the more negative is the terms of trade e¤ ect. In turn, the wholesale price charged to the technology laggard is even lower. Finally, as increases, in line with the above discussion, the wholesale price charged to a technology adopter increases.
Substituting (9) into (2), we obtain the per-period pro…ts of D i as
At t = 0, D 1 and D 2 choose T 1 and T 2 to maximize (6) and (7) after setting
From the resulting …rst-order conditions, we obtain
and
We con…rm that under wholesale price contracts, the downstream …rms always have incentives to adopt the technology and there is technological di¤usion in equilibrium. We also con…rm that the e¤ects of the upstream bargaining power and of the e¤ectiveness of the new technology on the optimal adoption dates are similar to the e¤ects under two-part tari¤ contracts (
The former result clearly reveals that the pro…ts sharing e¤ ect is also present in the case of wholesale price contracts. However, according to the following proposition, the optimal adoption dates crucially di¤er among the two contract types.
Proposition 3 (i) First adoption occurs earlier under two-part tari¤ contracts than under wholesale price contracts if and only if the upstream bargaining power is su¢ ciently low, that is, < 3 ( ), where @ 3 ( )=@ > 0.
(ii) Second adoption occurs earlier under two-part tari¤ contracts than under wholesale price contracts if and only if the new technology is not too e¤ ective and the upstream bargaining power is su¢ ciently low, that is, < 4 27 and < 4 ( ), where @ 4 ( )=@ < 0.
Technology adoption can take place earlier under two-part tari¤ contracts than under wholesale price contracts. This holds for …rst adoption as long as the downstream …rms are powerful enough (areas A and B in Figure 3 ). It also holds for second adoption, but only if the downstream …rms are powerful enough and the new technology is not too e¤ective (area A in Figure 3 ). The intuition for this …nding draws again on the interaction of the terms of trade e¤ ect and the pro…ts sharing e¤ ect. We know that the terms of trade e¤ ect is positive under two-part tari¤s and negative under wholesale price contracts. An immediate implication is that the output e¤ect is weaker under wholesale price contracts and thus favors later adoption under this contract type. By contrast, the pro…ts sharing e¤ ect favors faster adoption under wholesale price contracts. This holds because under wholesale price contracts, owing to the lack of the …xed fees, each D i obtains a greater share of the joint pro…ts than the share corresponding to its bargaining power. As a result, when D i adopts the technology, it obtains a greater share of the resulting higher pro…ts than it would obtain under two-part tari¤s, and thus it has stronger incentives to adopt the technology. The more powerful the upstream …rms are, the more the pro…ts sharing e¤ ect works in favor of wholesale prices and thus leads to earlier adoption under such contracts. In fact, when the technology is e¤ective enough, second adoption always occurs earlier under wholesale price than under two-part tari¤ contracts. This is because as increases, in contrast to what happens under wholesale price contracts, the terms of trade e¤ ect under two-part tari¤ contracts becomes more unfavorable for the technology laggard. This holds because, owing to the presence of double marginalization and the negative terms of trade e¤ ect, the output is lower and thus the output e¤ ect is weaker in a vertically related market in comparison to a one-tier market.
Extensions
Next, we extend our model in various dimensions to examine the robustness of our main results and explore the role of some of our assumptions.
Preemption Game
In the preemption game, each D i observes its rival's actions with no information lags and can respond immediately and costlessly to its adoption decision. This is a closed-loop scenario regarding the adoption dates of the …rms. 16 It is well known (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1985) that in the preemption game, in contrast to the precommitment game in which the …rst adopter obtains higher discounted pro…ts, symmetric …rms receive the same discounted pro…ts in equilibrium. If this were not so, the second adopter, who makes lower pro…ts than the …rst adopter, would have incentives to preempt the latter, that is, to adopt the new technology slightly earlier than the …rst adoption date. As a consequence, technology di¤usion also occurs in the preemption equilibrium.
In particular, the adoption strategy of D 2 is as follows. Given any adoption date for D 1 ,
, where " > 0 but is arbitrarily small. Note that in the former case, T 2 does not depend on 1 because D 2 decides on its adoption date as a single player in the continuation of the game. Faced with preemption by D 2 ; D 1 adopts the technology as late as possible, and in particular at
Note that the …rst-order condition for the maximization problem faced by D 2 is the same as in the precommitment game; hence, T 2 = T T 2 . Moreover, as the …rms'discounted pro…ts are the same in equilibrium, we obtain from (6) that
Hence, the optimal adoption date for the …rst adopter depends on the di¤erence in per-period equilibrium pro…ts between the technology leader and the technology laggard. As in Katz and Shapiro (1987), we refer to the latter as the …rst adopter's preemption incentives. In a vertically related market, preemption incentives are given by . In other words, the preemption incentives are stronger in the presence than in the absence of vertical relations as long as is su¢ ciently low. This is because when downstream as long as r > 0. Note, however, that the collusive outcome under constant but unequal marginal costs for the …rms crucially depends on the speci…c subtleties of the tacit agreement. Equal relative gains, the KalaiSmorodinsky solution, and the Nash bargaining solution lead to very distinct tacit collusive outcomes (see e.g., Schmalensee, 1987) . These outcomes then have a crucial impact on upstream-downstream bargaining over the two-part tari¤ terms, and thus on the incremental bene…ts and preemption incentives for technology adoption. As a consequence, comparison of the adoption dates under input outsourcing and insourcing crucially depends on the collusive outcome assumed each time.
…rms are relatively powerful in the market, they extract a higher share of the per-period joint pro…ts of the vertical chain. It is also because the di¤erence between the technology leader and laggard pro…ts is higher in a vertically related than in a one-tier market since the former is more heavily subsidized than the latter.
The optimal adoption dates in a vertically related market and a one-tier market cannot be compared analytically. Letting k(t) = e ( +r) with = 20 and r = 0:1, our numerical simulations qualitatively con…rm the results of Proposition 2: in the preemption game, …rst adoption takes place earlier under outsourcing than under insourcing, that is, T 1 < I 1 , if and only if the downstream bargaining power is su¢ ciently high. As we already know, the same holds for second adoption, that is, T 2 < I 2 , if and only if the downstream bargaining power is su¢ ciently high and the new technology is not too e¤ective. For example, we …nd that when = 0:1, T 1 < I 1 if < 0:3 and T 2 < I 2 (i.e., T T 2 < T I 2 ) if < 0:03. For higher values of , such as = 0:3, T 2 < I 2 never holds. More importantly, we …nd that in the preemption game, the range of values for which …rst adoption occurs earlier under outsourcing than under insourcing is greater in comparison to the precommitment game; for example, if = 0:1, T 1 < I 1 for all < 0:3, while T T 1 < T I 1 for a smaller range of ( < 0:2). 17
Product Di¤erentiation
We assumed so far that the downstream …rms produce a homogenous good. We consider now the case in which their products are di¤erentiated, so the demand function faced by each D i is p i (q i ; q j ) = a q i q j , where (0 < 1) is the degree of product substitutability. The lower , the more di¤erentiated the products are. We con…rm our main result regarding the di¤erence in speed of adoption between vertically related and one-tier markets if and only if product di¤erentiation is not too high. Intuitively, the closer substitutes the products are, the greater is the subsidization and the stronger is the positive terms of trade e¤ect and thus the stronger is the output e¤ect in a vertically related market. It follows that when product di¤erentiation is too high, the output e¤ect is relatively weak in a vertically related market and is o¤set by the pro…ts sharing e¤ect. Then both …rst and second adoption occur earlier in a one-tier market than in a vertically related market. is not too high. However, the positive impact of vertical relations is not driven by the output e¤ ect now. In fact, strategic complementarity under price competition makes the output e¤ect weaker under outsourcing than under insourcing. This is because the wholesale prices exceed the upstream marginal cost and the terms of trade e¤ ect is negative. The positive impact of vertical relations is instead driven by the presence of a novel e¤ect under outsourcing, the slotting allowances e¤ ect. This refers to the fact that when downstream …rms compete in prices and are powerful enough, the …xed fees turn out to be negative -they take the form of "slotting allowances". The slotting allowances increase when D i adopts the new technology.
Input-Saving Technology
We performed our analysis so far under the assumption that the new technology reduces the exogenous cost of the adopter. What happens when, instead, the new technology saves on the input quantity used? To answer this, we introduce a per unit of input cost, z, where 0 < z < a c, and assume that if D i adopts the new technology, then the input quantity required for production of one unit of …nal good decreases from 1 unit to 1 1+s , where s > 0. In this setting, e s 1+s z (a c z) , with e < 1 2 , captures how e¤ective the new technology is. We con…rm that all our main results also hold for an input-saving technology.
Concluding Remarks
We analyzed the timing of technology adoption in markets with input outsourcing, and thus in vertically related markets. The main contribution of our analysis is the demonstration that the organizational structure for production, input outsourcing or in-house input production, can crucially a¤ect the timing of technology adoption. More speci…cally, we showed that …rms can adopt a new technology earlier when they outsource their input production than when they 1 8 Alipranti and Petrakis (2013) provide an analysis of this case.
produce the input in-house. In other words, we concluded that vertical relations and trading may speed up technology adoption. This holds when vertical trading is conducted via two-part tari¤ contracts and the upstream bargaining power is su¢ ciently low.
An additional contribution of our analysis is that we pointed out that it is important to take into account the particular features of vertically related markets to understand the diverse patterns of technology adoption timing. In particular, we showed that the bargaining power distribution and the contract type used in a vertically related market can crucially a¤ect the speed of technology adoption. The higher the downstream bargaining power in a market, the earlier a new technology is adopted. Moreover, the use of two-part tari¤ contracts can lead to earlier adoption than the use of wholesale price contracts as long as the downstream …rms are su¢ ciently powerful.
We demonstrated that our main results are valid under various extensions of our basic framework (closed-loop preemption game, product di¤erentiation, price competition, and input-saving new technology). Nevertheless, we recognize that our paper is only the …rst step Precommitment game: Turning to the …rms' optimal adoption dates at t = 0, …rms 1 and 2 choose T 1 and T 2 , respectively, such as each to maximize their discounted sum of pro…ts. Here too I I 1 > I I 2 > 0; and thus there is technology di¤usion in equilibrium (T I 1 < T I 2 ). Moreover, 
I
T 1 increases at an increasing rate with ; while I T 2 increases at a decreasing rate with : Second, by inspection of (8), we see that 
